

714 f. 28.



A

# LETTER

TO THE

Author of the *London Journal*.



(Price Six-Pence.)

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THE

Author of *London Journal*



(Three Six-Pence)

A  
LETTER  
To the AUTHOR of the  
LONDON JOURNAL;

WHEREIN

The Sentiments of Mr. F O G, in relation to  
K. W. are fully explain'd and vindicated  
on *Philosophical* and *certain* Principles.

---

BY  
*MISELEUTHERUS PHIOPARADOX.*

---

Falsus honor *juvat*, & mendax infamia *terret*.

HOR.

--- *Descendunt Statuæ, restemque sequuntur.*

JUV.

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# ЯНТЕЛ


The Semantics of the *so* and *too* Conjunctions in English and German



# THE MUSEUM OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN

TOM DODD

Binded for J. R. Gannett, most of the copy  
in the New-York Public Library.



SIR,

**H**OPE the Love of Truth will be thought a sufficient Apology for troubling you with my Thoughts on the present Dispute between you and Mr. *Fog*. I am astonish'd, I assure you, Sir, to hear you contradict the modest


Assertions of that ingenious Writer, in relation to K. *W.* with as little Ceremony as you would show to a Porter; since there is no one Circumstance in all this Gentleman's remarkable Papers on the Subject between you, but what may be fairly deduced from a philosophical Principle, which you yourself, I dare say, will not pretend to reject. The Principle I mean is not new; but has been often and long ago maintained by Men of the greatest Eminence in the Republick of Letters, and is this; That all Men necessarily act upon Principles of Self-Interest; or, that a Regard to our own dear selves is the only Motive to every human Action. Mr. *Fog*, you well know, Sir,

B is

is not the Author of this Philosophy; but I will venture to affirm, that an Inference he draws from it is entirely *biſ*, and will be receiv'd as such by all his Fellow-Labourers in the Art of Reasoning. The Inference is this, That one Man can never deserve any thing of another. If any one shou'd ask me how I know this to be Mr. *Fog*'s Inference, since he has no where drawn it in express Words? I answer, It is impossible to reconcile his other inimitable Performances with what he has said of K. *W.* on any other Supposition. For, I defy all the Men in the World to refute the common Opinion of the Glory and Immortality of that Prince on any other Principles. And since he has not thought fit to indulge common Capacities in a methodical stating of the Propositions from which his Reasoning is deduced; I have taken the Liberty to do it for him, out of a sincere Regard for the good Cause which he has long been a glorious Champion for; not without some Hopes, that by this means bringing the Truth a little nearer to the Eyes of all such short-sighted Gentlemen as yourself, I shall be able to make you see and acknowledge it. Thus much I thought it necessary to preface in Vindication of Mr. *Fog* and myself. Give me leave now, Sir, to prove the Justness of this Inference. As for the Premises from which it is drawn, I beg, Sir, you wou'd remember, they are granted on all Sides before I begin; and therefore don't fall upon me for them, when you begin to see the Force of my Reasoning, and do not know how to escape me. The Proposition Mr. *Fog* infers from the above-mentioned

mention'd Premises is this: "That no Man can "deserve well of another." In order to prove this, I argue thus: It is evident to every one that can think, that *A* cannot deserve well of *B* by an Action, if *A* was not *in some measure* induced to commit that Action by a Kindness or Regard for *B*. But, according to our first Principle, the only Motive that prevail'd upon *A* to act, was a Regard to *A*'s own self; and consequently *A* cou'd not deserve any thing of *B* for that Action. Now, Sir, give me leave to exemplify this Doctrine thus: *K. W.* was induced to rescue us from Slavery by a Regard to his own Interest alone; and therefore never cou'd, nor ever can, by all the Rules of Logick, deserve well of the English Nation. This being prov'd, it may be as easily demonstrated, that no one can deserve ill of another; for if a Regard to themselves alone, be the only Motive that determines them to act, no one can commit an Action out of any ill Will or Malice to another. And if it be the Intention of every Action, as it confessedly is, and not the Action it self, that denominates the Action good or bad, no Man can possibly deserve ill of another for any Action, because it is impossible for the Intention of any Actor to be ill. Q. E. D. Let us now exemplify again. *K. 7.* trampled upon many Laws, both Human and Divine, not out of any ill Will to his Subjects, but purely out of a Regard to that Religion and that Government, which he thought wou'd make him most happy; and consequently cou'd not deserve any ill from those who foolishly imagin'd themselves to be injur'd. Or, to

to instance in Mr. *Fog*: He abuses the Memory of K. *W.* and perpetually vents such Doctrines as tend to destroy the natural Rights of Mankind, and propagate Slavery; not out of any real Love to the Consequences of such Principles, but because he is determin'd by the great Principle of Self-Preservation; because Nature prevails upon him to do any thing rather than starve, and teaches him to prefer a Bad Cause to a Jayl or a Whipping-Post. How ridiculous therefore are the Pretensions of K. *W.* or of any other Hero since the Creation to Glory and Immortality; and how like Enthusiasts and Madmen do we act, when we ascribe it to 'em? I suspect it will be objected, that tho' *A* acts not of Kindness to *B*; yet if *A*'s Action conveys any Advantage to *B*, *A* deserves well of *B*, as being the Instrument of Happiness to *B*; or otherwise a Parent cannot deserve well of a Child. I readily allow this Consequence, as strange as it may seem to some People of less Thought than Mr. *Fog* and my self, and do assert, that no Parent can possibly deserve well of a Child: For as it is evident that nothing but the Pleasure, which Nature has wisely made to attend Copulation, as a sure Means to induce Male and Female to propagate their Species, was the only Motive of the Parent's begetting; so also it is as certain, that either Vanity, Fear, or Pity, all which Passions are fairly and truly resolvable into that primary one of Self-Love, is the true Cause of his maintaining and nourishing that Life, which, without the abovesaid Motive, the Child wou'd never have enjoy'd, till the Releasement



the Country of the world. I will not be  
troublous, since the less no Man's opinion is in the  
least Mistrust, I shal, It is impossible to concen-  
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**H**OPE the Love of Truth will be thought a sufficient Apology for troubling you with my Thoughts on the present Dispute between you and Mr. Fog. I am astonish'd, I assure you, Sir, to hear you contradict the modest Assertions of that ingenious Writer, in relation to K. W. with as little Ceremony as you would shew to a Porter; since there is no one Circumstance in all this Gentleman's remarkable Papers on the Subject between you, but what may be fairly deduced from a philosophical Principle, which you yourself, I dare say, will not pretend to reject. The Principle I mean is not new; but has been often and long ago maintained by Men of the greatest Eminence in the Republick of Letters, and is this; That all Men necessarily act upon Principles of Self-Interest; or, that a Regard to our own dear selves is the only Motive to every human Action. Mr. Fog, you well know, Sir,

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leasement of *Prometheus*, or the Revival of his Art. If therefore the Parent does not maintain and nourish the Child out of any abstracted Kindness to the Child it self, but out of a Regard to his own Happiness, it necessarily follows, that he can by no means deserve well of it: And yet, Sir, how vulgar is this Error grown! how strongly is this Doctrine inculcated by People of all Qualities! This Opinion has been from all Ages, and continues yet to be infused into the Minds of Children, as soon as they are capable of knowing any thing; and so irresistible is the Force of those Prejudices one receives from one's Mother or Nurse, that it is a common thing to meet with Men of the best Understanding, who embrace this Error as strong as they do any one self-evident Proposition. But, alas! there are many more and great Errors, which I have with unspeakable Grief observ'd to prevail daily amongst us, to the vast Detriment of good Sense and Orthodoxy. As therefore Mr. *Fog* has hitherto happily succeeded (and I believe by this time, Sir, you will not deny it your self) in divesting a K. of those Titles he had long and most scandalously usurp'd, I shall take the Freedom to intreat him to make a right Use of his Success, and pursue his inimitable Method of Reasoning to the universal Destruction of Ignorance and Folly, and to the great Emolument of all his patient Readers. If he will favour me with this Request, (and I think the Motives I urge to him, can't fail to operate on his Publick Spirit) I shall hope to see him prove in a very little time, that *Alexander* C. was

was as insignificant a Fellow as any Corporal in his Army; and that *Nero* had as good a Right to the Title of *Delicia humani generis*, as that lucky Emperor to whom the *Romans* so partially asctib'd it. I cou'd enumerate many more Instances, Sir, to confirm the Proof I have given of the Justice of Mr. *Fog's* Philosophy; but I think the Truth of it so fully appears already, that I can't help assuring my self, it will be universally receiv'd, when the Blessings we enjoy under the present Establishment, which are no trifling Objections to it, as being vulgarly thought Consequences of the Revolution, shall be quite destroy'd and abolish'd. In the mean time, I must confess, Mr. *Fog* will labour under a Disadvantage which is peculiar to his Philosophy, and seems to tend to prevent its kind Reception in the World. I mean, he cannot possibly have that Praise and Applause which generally attends the Publication of a new Philosophy, and has contributed to settle most of the different ones that have appear'd in the World, more than all the Demonstrations they have all of 'em pretended to: For all that agree to Mr. *Fog's* Doctrine, must, in consequence of it, think that he can deserve no Praise; and those who do not assent to it, tho' they may be ready to praise him on another Occasion, yet can't be suppos'd to do it on this. This, I own to you, Sir, is a Disadvantage to Mr. *Fog's* Scheme: But, great as it appears to be, it must give way to Truth, which wil always be embraced by such sincere Admirers of it as Mr. *Fog* and myself, in spight of many

Consequence that follows from it. *Magna res est  
veritas, & praevalebit.*

Thus far, I think, Mr. Fog is sufficiently vindicated, as to what he lays in relation to K. W.

You must give me leave now, Sir, to defend a Paragraph in his Journal of Saturday the 13th of this Instant, which I easily foresee your Prejudices will lead you to deny. The Paragraph I mean is this. For my part, I think the Difference very little, which Side we are Bigots and Slaves to; the Nation must equally suffer, whether we give this Support to Doctrines of Liberty, or arbitrary Power. Now I take this to be a Consequence of that Proposition, That an Excess of Slavery is as desirable as an Excess of Liberty. For to have a violent Passion (as is here meant by being Bigots and Slaves) for any Doctrine, can neither be good nor bad, but as the Doctrine it self is so. If therefore we equally suffer by supporting the Doctrines of Liberty or arbitrary Power, it is for no other Reason, but because the Doctrines of Liberty and arbitrary Power are equally bad. And since no one ever supports a Doctrine honestly and sincerely for any other Reason, but because he loves the Subject of that Doctrine, and shou'd be glad to see it establish'd; it necessarily follows, that Mr. Fog cou'd not declare these opposite Doctrines to be equally bad to this Kingdom, unless he thought an Excess of Liberty and Slavery (which are the Subject-matter of these Doctrines) to be equally bad also. Here we have an Instance of Mr. Fog's peculiar Modesty. Any other Man of his Party wou'd not have scrupled to have said, that an Excess of Liberty is much worse than an

Excess

Excess of Slavery. But Mr. Fog was cautious of giving Offence, and therefore only says it is *as bad*. But since I am of another Complexion, and seldom have the Disadvantage of being put to the Blush, I shall undertake to prove it is much worse; it being nothing but what is agreeable to the Dictates of my Conscience.

This, Sir, I make no doubt, will seem very strange to your singular Apprehension; but I will take upon me to affirm, that it is as clearly demonstrable, as that an Excess of Vice is preferable to an Excess of Virtue. I might easily produce a great Number of Passages out of the wise Ancients, to whose Determination we ought always to have the greatest Regard, to prove that they were of this Opinion in relation to Vice; but I shall content myself with offering only two, being more desirous at present to prove this most important Proposition of mine concerning an Excess of Liberty. The first is,

*Tantum Religio potuit suadere malorum.*

If any one shou'd object to the Force of this Passage, by saying the Author of it was an Atheist, and therefore his Words ought to have no Authority with us; I shall desire them to consider, that tho' *Lucretius* himself had no Religion, yet the Action which draws this Reflection from him, was univerſally condemn'd by all the wise People of his Time, whose Attachment to the Religion of their Country can never be doubted: so that in these Words he speaks the Sentiments of his learned Countrymen, as well as his own. And in Confirmation of this I must observe, that the Word

*Religio*

Excess

*Relligio* here does not signify Religion, but a too strict Regard to Virtue, or the *arbitrary* Will of the Gods; which has lately been prov'd by some ingenious Gentlemen of the University of C—m—dge to be the same thing.

But to my next Quotation there can be no manner of Objection made, it being one of the divine Sentences of the poetical Moralist, whose Opinion either does, or (as Dr. B——ly says) *ought* to prevail with every one. He expressly says,

*Insani sanus nomen ferat, aequus iniqui  
Ultra quam satis est, Virtutem s' petit ipsam.*

This is so strong a Proof of the Judgment of the Ancients in my Favour, that I shall continue this Digression no farther, but return to prove my precedent Proposition.

Now that an Excess of Liberty is much worse than an Excess of Slavery, is evident; because an Excess of Liberty may sometimes give some Men an Opportunity of doing ill; whereas an Excess of Slavery only takes away most Opportunities of doing good. An Excess of Slavery is preferable, in as much as a Possibility of receiving ill is much worse than an absolute Certainty of it. In short, no Man in his Senses wou'd chuse an Excess of Liberty rather than an Excess of Slavery; because an Excess of Liberty gives some Men more Power than they need to have; whereas an Excess of Slavery only denies every Man so much as he ought to have. But perhaps some will say, Tho' we grant an Excess of Slavery to be preferable to an Excess of Liberty, yet it does not follow that a moderate Degree of Slavery is better than a moderate Degree of Liberty. To which I answer,

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This does not at all affect my Proposition, which was only this, "That an Excess of Slavery is better than an Excess of Liberty." Nevertheless, I think this Consequence may be fairly drawn from Mr. Fog's Premises, as I shall now undertake to show. It is easy to see Mr. Fog here prefers Slavery to Liberty, not only as it is in *Excess*, but also as it is *Slavery*. If therefore *Slavery*, as it is *Slavery*, is more eligible than *Liberty*; then it follows, that tho' a small Degree of it is not so desirable as a greater, yet it is always to be wish'd for in some measure rather than *Liberty*. But Mr. Fog had no Occasion to explain his Sense so minutely as I have done for you, Sir; for he thought very justly, that all Men of Sense and Learning wou'd readily see, that there can be no such thing as *Liberty* or *Slavery*, without *Excess*; the very Words necessarily imply it. For as to be *Slaves*, is to exceed a Power which some mistaken Men foolishly imagine Nature has given us; so to be *free*, is to go beyond or exceed those Bounds or Laws which one or more shall think fit to restrain every Body by but themselves. But what if Men had such a thing as a *Right to Liberty*, wou'd any Man be so absurd as to say the *Peace of the Whole* ought not to be preserv'd at the Expence of, and by the Violation of the Rights of any one or more Individuals? Or can any one be so ignorant in the History of all Ages and Nations, as to affirm, that the *Peace of Society* ever was preserv'd by any other Means? *Ob! pavor! O pietas!* *O tempora! O mores!*

But this does not only appear from the Nature and Reason of things, but it is also confirm'd by the Testimony and Determination of those Men, who must be allow'd to be adequate Judges of this Matter, as

having try'd both sides of the Question, I appeal to the Judgment of all those unprejudiced Gentlemen, who from an unlimited Liberty of rambling in every Part of this great City, of putting their Hands into every Man's Pocket, of breaking thro' every Door that unreasonably stood in their way to Riches and Honour, have all on a sudden, by an odd kind of Power, been confin'd within the narrow Limits of a Goal. I appeal, I say, to the Judgment of these Gentlemen, who after a most mature Deliberation, and having had Time enough to rid themselves of their Prejudices, have been known to prefer this most compleat Slavery to their former Liberty. This has been most notoriously prov'd by an Occasion which the Clemency of his present Majesty not long ago offer'd us. It is easy to see I hint at the general Goal-Delivery, which gave a great Number of Men an Opportunity of regaining their Liberty; an Opportunity they made no other use of, than to show the World they were happy already, and that this Offer of Liberty was so far from being an Obligation, that in their Judgment, it was an open Attempt upon their Happiness.

Nor has this Opinion been maintain'd by the Moderns alone. No; the Ancients have been stronger Assertors of it, than any amongst us. They carry'd it much farther; even so far as to prefer Death to the Loss of their Slavery, as appears from an old Distich in one of the Minor Poets,

'Εις φυλακὴν Βληθείς ποτὲ Μάρτιον δ' αἴρετος, ἐκοπή<sup>το</sup>  
'Οκνῶν δέελθειν ὀμολόγησε φόνον.

Here we see a very extraordinary Instance of the Love  
of

of Slavery, which deserves to be recorded amongst Acts of the most consummate Heroism. And no Man, that knows any thing of Antiquity, can suffer himself to suspect that this was the only Instance of this kind amongst them.

Thus, Sir, I have endeavour'd to convince you, by as many Arguments as I cou'd crowd into a Letter, of the unreasonable Vanity of K.W.'s Pretence to Glory, and of the Justness of Mr. Fog's Principles concerning the Doctrine of Liberty, I am not without some Hopes, that what I have offer'd may prevail upon you to renounce those Errors you had too hastily and passionately embraced ; but if you shou'd think fit to disappoint me, and retain your former Notions, how repugnant soever to common Sense, you will give me thereby an Opportunity of shewing my Sincerity to the World, in some measure, by the Practice of my Doctrine, in submitting to your unreasonable Authority and professing my self,

*Your most obedient Slave,*



M. PHILOPARADOX.